Il presente scritto è in corso di pubblicazione in Jus, 2012, n. 1 e rappresenta il testo, con alcuni adattamenti ed aggiunte, della relazione svolta dall’autore alla Facoltà di giurisprudenza dell’Università Cattolica di Milano lo scorso 5 aprile 2011 nel contesto di un seminario dedicato alla memoria del prof. Luigi Mengoni. Ringrazio il prof. Mario Napoli per l’invito. Dedico il saggio alla memoria del prof. Gino Giugni.

The author first of all demonstrates that Luigi Mengoni, ever since his writings on obligations in the 1950s, kept the idea at the forefront that developing legal rules presupposes their evaluation by jurists. It is just this evaluation which modern theorists of the method must rationalize, in order to monitor the determination of disputes. Mengoni  was convinced of the need to examine this aspect in depth,  through his study of employment and labour law and, in particular, the problems brought about, in the European context, too, by the spread of Taylorism.  Gino Giugni, especially, knew  well, and ahead of his time, to address the issue before establishing the system of legal rules. In the essay which is the subject of this re-reading, Mengoni, following the movement which was re-evaluating practical philosophy, therefore developed the theory of a relationship of interaction at all levels, between themes which were specifically legal and those of a practical kind. Recently this thinking has been exploited by  a new dogmatism, conservative in nature, holding that M mistakenly theorized that the determination of disputes should be based exclusively on the feasibility of integrating the judgment itself within the existing system of conceptual law. The essay reveals the extent of this exploitation.